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NOTE
THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT:
A FEDERAL COMMITMENT TO
PRODUCT SAFETY
It is estimated that 20 million Americans are injured each year in
and around the home. Of this number, 30,000 die, and 110,000 are per-
manently disabled.' To be sure, many of these injuries are the result
of the victim's own carelessness. However, it is equally clear that an
unacceptable number of injuries are caused by defective products, or
products designed so as to present immediate hazards to users and by-
standers. Furthermore, proper design and construction could reduce
the incidence and severity of many injuries, including those caused by
the user's own negligence. Recognizing this problem Congress, in 1972,
enacted the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA).2
The Act fashions a comprehensive federal scheme for regulation
of consumer product safety. The principal vehicle by which the man-
date of the Act is to be accomplished is the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, an independent regulatory agency created by the legis-
lation. The Commission has authority to establish standards to which
consumer products must conform, with several avenues of enforcement
at its disposal. The Act, in addition to investing the Commission with
fairly tough enforcement powers, contains innovative provisions to
spur consumer vigilance. One of these permits a "mandamus-like" pro-
ceeding to compel the Commission to act against a particular hazard. 3
Inasmuch as the problem of product hazards is universally recog-
nized, the instant legislation received broad bipartisan support. The
need for effective regulation was acknowledged by Republicans and
Democrats, businessmen and consumers alike. All agreed that federal
preemption of the area was essential.4 Hence, the debate was largely
I NAT'L COMM'N ON PRODucT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 9 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NCPS
REPORT].
2 Pub. L. No. 92-573 (Oct. 27, 1972) [hereinafter cited as CPSAJ.
3 Id. § 10(e).
4 See id. § 2(a):
The Congress finds that -
(4) control by State and local governments of unreasonable risks of injury asso-
ciated with consumer products is inadequate and may be burdensome to manu-
facturers;
(6) regulation of consumer products the distribution of which affects interstate or
foreign commerce is necessary to carry out this Act.
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confined to specifics, such as the manner by which regulation was to
be achieved - not trifling matters, but not the sort of dispute which
seriously jeopardized prospects for passage. The Bill passed both
houses of Congress by wide margins. 5
BACKGROUND
Until enactment of the CPSA, the federal government had no
comprehensive means of regulating consumer product safety. Thereto-
fore, Congress had taken a piecemeal approach, legislating with respect
to specific hazards as they appeared. The Flammable Fabrics Act,6 the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,7 the Poison Prevention
Packaging Act,8 the Child Protection and Toy Safety Act,9 the Refrig-
erator Door Act,10 and other statutes evidence the patchwork approach
taken. Each is the result of a laudable effort to deal with a specific
product hazard; however, for every hazard addressed by specific legis-
lation, dozens have evaded regulation.
The range of potential hazards is vast. The National Commission
on Product Safety (NCPS) studied only a small number of product
categories, yet found each to be responsible for an extraordinary
number of injuries and deaths. Every year, about 100,000 Americans
are maimed walking through glass doors, 125,000 are hurt by power
tools, 700,000 children are injured by toys, and approximately 10,000
television sets (predominantly color models) catch fire." Thus, among
the myriad products found in and around the home there exist very
serious dangers. Decisive action was, therefore, required.
Industry self-regulation has proven inadequate in reducing or
eliminating hazards. It is not that manufacturers are so callous as to
market unsafe products deliberately; rather, it is the unfortunate truth
that safety is not a major factor considered in the marketing equation.12
The National Commission on Product Safety, in its final report, urged federal preemption.
NCPS REPORT, supra note 1, at 119. In addition, several industry spokesmen at hearings
on the legislation emphasized the need for preemption. See Hearings on H.R. 8110, H.R.
8157, HR. 260, and H.R. 3813 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 794, 863,
1216 (1971) (statements of Walter S. Lewis, Jr., Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association,
Inc.; J. Edward Day, Electronic Industries Association; James M. Goldberg, American
Retail Federation) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
5 69 to 10 in the Senate. 118 CONG. REc. S9932 (daily ed. June 21, 1972). 319 to 50 in
the House. 118 CoNe. REc. 18607 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1972).
6 15 U.S.C. § 1191 et seq. (1970).
7 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (1970).
8 15 U.S.C. § 1471 et seq. (1970).
9 Act of Nov. 6, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-113, 83 Stat. 187.
10 15 U.S.C. § 1211 et seq. (1970).
11 NCPS REPORT, supra note 1, at 12, 13, 26, 30.
12 No manufacturer deliberately sets out to make a product to hurt or kill the
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That safety does not sell products is a merchandising axiom. In the
case of items like glass containers, toys, and fabrics which do not on
their faces seem to present any serious danger, there is no pressing
consumer demand for increased safety. Moreover, modifications to
eliminate hazards often increase a product's cost, and place its manu-
facturer at a competitive disadvantage. Therefore, there remains little
incentive for manufacturers to take the initiative in effectively dealing
with product hazards.' 3
Voluntary standards established by industries have also failed. The
NCPS reported:
[T]hese standards are chronically inadequate, both in scope and
permissible levels of risk. They do not address themselves to all
significant foreseeable hazards. They give insufficient consideration
to human factors such as predictable risk-taking, juvenile behavior,
illiteracy, or inexperience. The levels of allowed exposure to elec-
trical, thermal, and mechanical and other energy exchanges are
frequently too high.14
Furthermore, the scope of coverage of voluntary standards leaves much
to be desired. The NCPS found that 26 of the 44 product categories
which ranked highest in estimated annual injuries were either not
covered at all by industrywide standards, or that existing standards
were grossly inadequate.1 5 It is fair to conclude that dependence on
private initiative is no substitute for government action in this area
of public concern.
Reliance on state and local regulation would be equally mis-
placed. As the NCPS found:
State and local governments - with only a few exceptions - offer
consumers little or no protection from hazardous household prod-
ucts. In many instances, consumer product legislation may be
worse than none; laws that provide only an illusion rather than the
reality of protection destroy confidence in Government and in the
legislative process.
... State and local regulation of consumer products is vitiated by
person who buys it. Even those who heedlessly marketed the "torch" sweaters of
a few years back did not intend to incinerate some of the purchasers; it was just
that they did not think about safety.
Statement of Dr. Philip R. Lee, NCPS Hearing, Oct. 21, 1968, quoted in NCPS REP'ORT,
supra note 1, at 62.
13 Competition does not inevitably take the form of a rivalry to produce the safest
product. Indeed, the competitive struggle may sometimes lead to a "shaving" of
the costs of manufacture involving some sacrifice of safety. Nor does competition
always reward, in the form of greater volume and higher profits, the manufacturer
who tries to sell "safety" as a feature of his product.
Philip Elman, Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, quoted in H. HamoN,
FEDERAL CONSUMER SAFETY LEGISLATION 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as H. HEFFRON].




narrow scope, diffuse jurisdiction, minuscule budgets, absence of
enforcement, mild sanctions, and casual administration.' 8
States can only regulate activities within their own borders. To require
that manufacturers conform to 50 different standards would work a
tremendous hardship. Federal regulation is obviously preferable for
that reason alone. Additionally, state legislators are notoriously sus-
ceptible to the entreaties of lobbyists. While there may be a role for
states and localities to play in product safety regulation, the major
thrust must be federal.17
The NOPS was created in 1967 and empowered to hold hearings,
conduct studies to identify the extent of the product safety problem,
and propose legislation to deal with it.18 After two years, the Commis-
sion transmitted to the President and Congress its final report, which
included a proposed bill.19 In 1971, legislation similar in form to the
Commission's proposal was introduced in both houses of Congress, and
hearings were held.20 A year later, the focus was in the Senate where
Senators Magnuson and Moss enthusiastically championed the legis-
lation. The major dispute centered around structure and coverage, i.e.,
whether a new agency should be created2' or increased authority should
instead be given to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as pro-
posed by the Administration bill,22 and whether the legislation should
apply to food, drugs, and cosmetics as well as to other household prod-
ucts (thereby usurping all FDA functions).2 3 Both houses agreed upon
the independent agency concept, but while the Senate version included
food and drug coverage,24 the House limited the bill's scope to con-
sumer products then outside the realm of the FDA.25 The House pre-
vailed in conference,28 and the CPSA was signed into law by President
Nixon on October 27, 1972.
16 Id. at 81.
17 The NCPS recommended state and local action when it is desired to regulate
product installation or use. The CPSA allows state safety standards to be enforced when
they are (1) more stringent than federal standards, (2) required by compelling local condi-
tions, and (3) do not unduly burden interstate commerce. CPSA § 26(c).
18 Act of Nov. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466.
19 See House Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 499-532. Despite the fact that the NCPS
had no regulatory power, it had a great effect upon industry, prompting improved stand-
ards, product changes, and the removal of hazardous products from the market. A signal
achievement was the implementation of the Child Protection and Toy Safety Act of 1969.
20S. 983; H.R. 8157; H.R. 260; H.R. 1371; H.R. 1569; H.R. 5518; H.R. 3813; H.R.
5218; H.R. 7768; H.R. 8337; H.R. 10078, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
21 S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
22 S. 1797, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
2 S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
24 Id., as passed, 118 CONG. REc. S993241 (daily ed. June 21,1972).
25 S. 3419, as amended, 118 CoNc. Rac. I-8599-607 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1972).
26 H.R. REP. No. 92-1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION
To implement the Act, Congress created the Consumer Product
Safety Commission. This is an independent regulatory agency, com-
posed of five Commissioners appointed by the President to serve seven
year terms. One member is designated Chairman, with authority to
exercise administrative functions.27 The Commission has the power to
promulgate consumer product safety rules, 23 to commence enforce-
ment actions (although concurrence of the Attorney General is gen-
erally required for court action),29 to supervise compliance with the
Act through inspection of facilities and records, 30 to collect and dis-
seminate information concerning product-related injuries and testing
procedures,81 to conduct safety-oriented research,3 2 and to perform
other miscellaneous functions necessary to the agency's operation. 33
Structure and Organization
A threshold question is whether or not the addition of another
autonomous agency to the already ponderous federal bureaucracy is a
viable means of confronting the problem of product hazards. Indeed,
the Administration's product safety proposals would have lodged this
responsibility within the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW) by adding to the duties of the FDA.3 4 Much of the debate
preceding the passage of the Act concerned this very point.3 5
Criticism of the various federal regulatory agencies is well-
founded.36 All too often these agencies have either forsaken the pub-
lic interest, or have been ineffective in its defense. Coziness between
27 CPSA § 4(f. On May 14, 1973, the first four appointees to the Commission took
office. Richard 0. Simpson, former Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and
Technology, is Chairman. The other Commissioners are Barbara Hackman Franklin,
former White House Staff Assistant for Executive Manpower; Lawrence M. Kushner,
former Acting Director of the National Bureau of Standards; Constance E. Newman, who
had been the Director of VISTA; and Dr. R. David Pittle, formerly assistant professor of
electrical engineering and public affairs at Carnegie-Mellon University and president of
the Pittsburgh Alliance for Consumer Protection.
28 Id. § 7.




33 Id. § 27.
34 S. 1797; H.R. 8110, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
835 See 118 CONG. REG. S9890-901 (daily ed. June 21, 1972) (debate leading to defeat
(51-32) of Senator Cotton's amendment which would have situated product safety respon-
sibility in the FDA).
86 See generally L. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS (1969). The author concludes, after
examining the inadequacies of regulatory agencies, that these agencies should be abolished
and their powers redistributed among the three branches of government. Id. at 290.
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the regulators and the regulated, insufficient funding, lack of meaning-
ful enforcement power, and general indifference and sloth have con-
tributed to agency impotence. The FDA has not escaped similar con-
demnation.37
Government reports have severely criticized FDA's organizational
structure and scientific activities.38 The FDA's enforcement of existing
product safety legislation, such as the Poison Prevention Packaging
Act3 9 and the Child Protection and Toy Safety Act,40 has also come
under fire.41 Commenting on FDA's enforcement technique, one
report noted:
FDA's penchant for negotiating with violators of the [Federal
Hazardous Substances Act] is said to be the result of a belief that it
produces compliance quickly and with the least expenditure of
available resources. Such an approach, however, could also foster
a cavalier attitude toward compliance by some manufacturers who
may be willing to chance possible violations in the knowledge that
discovery is likely to produce little more than protracted negotia-
tions for label changes.42
Additionally, responsibility in the FDA is diffuse, and its product
safety staff lies below several tiers of authority.43 Safety of products
other than food and drugs receives low priority in the agency, and only
a small staff is assigned to this area.44 The HEW bureaucracy itself is
so cumbersome that proposals have been made to divide it into more
manageable segments.45 In short, adding product safety to FDA's re-
sponsibilities would not be conducive to achievement of the Act's goals.
What are the advantages of an independent agency? According to
37 See generally J. Tumam, THE CHEMIcAL FRAr (1970), for a scathing indictment of
FDA's performance in the regulation of food and drugs. The report, a product of a
Ralph Nader study group, has been criticized for its polemical tone and casual scholar-
ship, but it nonetheless provides revealing insight into FDA's severe shortcomings.
38 See F. MALEK, ANAYLSiS AND RECOMiMENDATIONS: THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRA-
TION ORGANIZATIONAL REviEw (1969), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 3, at
982-86. See also REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF FOOD AND DRUGS FROM THE FDA AD Hoc
SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (1971), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 3,
at 986-1015.
39 15 U.S.C. § 1471 et seq. (1970).
40 Act of Nov. 6, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-113, 83 Stat. 187.
41 See House Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 888-91, featuring an exchange of cor-
respondence between Ralph Nader and Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Elliot
Richardson; id., pt. 3, at 926, 928 (statement of David A. Swankin of Consumers Union).
42 H. HEEFRON, supra note 13, at 196.
43 Id. at 213.
44 Id. at 208. The entire Office of Product Safety numbers 169. Id. at 213.
45 The most recent Congressional efforts were H.R. 16198, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)
and S. 1485, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), both proposing the creation of a cabinet level
Department of Education. Neither reached the floor.
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proponents of the idea, they are independence, enabling the agency to
resist external pressures, greater public visibility,4 6 and greater lever-
age in obtaining funding.47 Opponents argue convincingly that many
existing independent agencies have been ineffective despite these
attributes.48 However, that is no argument for entrusting major respon-
sibility to an agency such as FDA whose performance may fairly be
described as lackluster. The Consumer Product Safety Commission
must be sufficiently independent of both the private sector and of the
White House in order to perform its tasks without interference. By
functioning in a highly visible manner the Commission will help create
a public awareness of product hazards and consequent demand for their
elimination. Its aspirations need not be constrained by overbearing
departmental policies. In addition, the Commission can make its own
case for appropriations unhampered by intradepartmental competition.
Opponents of an independent agency argue that the FDA's ex-
pertise in the area should not be sacrificed, nor should the "close rela-
tionship" between product safety and HEW's other health functions
be disrupted.49 However, since FDA's concern with general product
safety is so minor, and its record so poor, this argument is not per-
suasive. A more telling criticism is the contention that unconscionable
delay in remedial action will result during the evolution of an entirely
new agency. 50 But in view of FDA's skeletal product safety staff, it is
apparent that similar delays would attend the delegation of new re-
sponsibilities to that agency.
President Nixon has set forth two prerequisites to any addition
to the federal bureaucracy.5 1 First, it must be shown that responsibil-
ity for a specific area is divided among several existing agencies and is
not a principal function of any of them. Neither the FDA nor the
46 See NCPS REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-6.
47 See S. REP. No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1972). Senator Cotton, dissenting
from the majority report, shows how the budget of the FDA has increased far more
dramatically than that of the independent Federal Trade Commission. However, these
figures are deceptive, since there is very little relationship between the duties of the two
agencies, and it is quite possible that FDA's financial needs have grown faster than those
of the FTC. The figures do not effectively refute the contention that independence may
lead to more favorable budgetary treatment.
48 See S. REP. No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 141-43 (1972) (supplemental views of
Senator Cotton).
49 See S. REP. No. 92-835, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1972) (supplemental views of Senator
Dominick); S. REP. No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 137, 146 (1972) (minority views of
Senator Cotton).
50 See H. HEFFRON, supra note 13, at 213. In fact, the Commission has geared up
rather rapidly. Draft safety standards for matches and tricycles were circulated within a
month after the Commission legally came into existence. See CCH CONSUMER PRODUcT
SAFETY GUIDE $1 41,087-88 (1978).
51 Presidential Message accompanying Reorganization Plans Nos. 3 & 4 of 1970 (July 9,
1970) in U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6322, 6332 (1970).
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Department of Commerce, the two agencies with primary federal re-
sponsibility in the product safety area, accords a high priority to such
regulation. Extensive regulation of consumer products is essentially a
new federal effort and should therefore warrant a new agency. Secondly,
it must be shown that centralization of authority would be beneficial.
Clearly, the creation of a new agency with broad jurisdiction over con-
sumer products is preferable to parceling out fragmented duties to
agencies which are otherwise occupied.
The benefits to be gained from Commission independence could,
however, easily prove illusory should the Commissioners fail to ap-
proach their undertaking with dedication and impartiality. The statute
cannot guarantee zeal; but it can aim to hold the interests of the public
paramount to those of the Commissioners. Thus the Act bars from
Commission membership anyone holding a pecuniary interest in, or
business relationship with, a manufacturer or seller of consumer prod-
ucts.52 In addition, the Act goes beyond the general federal conflict-of-
interest statute53 in prohibiting Commission officials from accepting
employment or compensation from any manufacturer of consumer
products within a year after leaving government service.54 These pro-
visions are stringent but are intended to avert the community of in-
terest which inevitably arises when regulatory officials are plucked from
the ranks of industry only to return to private enterprise and join the
very same firms with whose regulation they had previously been
charged.5 5 Administration officials were critical of this across-the-board
limitation. Then-Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst worried about
"minimiz[ing] the attractiveness of the Agency's top positions" and
thereby limiting the available talent pool.58 A more imaginative ra-
tionalization went as follows:
52 CPSA § 4(c).
53 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1970).
54 CPSA § 4(g)(2). The restrictions imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 207 on post-employment
activity are limited to matters with which the employee was connected while in govern-
ment, or which were within the scope of his official duties.
55 The "revolving door" phenomenon is particularly evident at the Department of
Agriculture. Clifford Hardin, after resigning as Secretary of Agriculture, took an executive
position with Ralston Purina. Clarence D. Paimby and Clifford G. Pulvermacher, USDA
officials who played a major role in negotiating the sale of $750 million worth of wheat
to the Soviet Union, left the department shortly thereafter to assume high-level positions
with Continental Grain Co. and Bunge Corp., major grain exporters. Palmby was replaced
as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs by Carroll Brunthaver,
who had once been with Cook Industries, Inc., another agribusiness concern.
Other examples outside the USDA include Alan Boyd, former Secretary of Transpor-
tation who became Chairman of Illinois Central Industries, Inc., parent company of the
Illinois Central Railroad, and Claude Brinegar, who left the Union Oil Company to
become Secretary of Transportation.
56 S. REP. No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 93, 95-96 (1972) (letter from Richard G.
Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney General, to the Senate Commerce Committee).
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[A] company manufacturing consumer products may wish to em-
ploy a former [Commission] official in order to obtain the benefit
of his skill and experience in reducing or eliminating the risks of
injury associated with its products. 57
If only industry were so nobly motivated.
Information and Research Functions
In order to effectuate a program of product safety, it is necessary
to obtain data relevant to product-related injuries and to disseminate
safety information derived therefrom to the public. Accordingly, in
the CPSA, Congress stressed the research and reporting duties of the
Commission.58
The Commission requires information regarding the nature and
incidence of product-related injuries in order to identify hazards and
establish priorities. It is, therefore, directed to establish an Injury
Information Clearinghouse 59 which will collect and analyze injury
statistics. The National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS),
a computer network set up by FDA's Bureau of Product Safety to
monitor hospital emergency room admissions, will aid the informa-
tion gathering process. 60
The Commission is also authorized to conduct research into causa-
tion and prevention of product-related injuries and to develop appro-
priate methods for design analysis and safety testing of assembled prod-
ucts. 61 The construction of a research facility is authorized by the
Act 6 2 and funds for it may be appropriated over and above the overall
authorization for the Commission.65 It may be that a substantial Com-
mission role in research, other than statistical analysis, will be slow in
57 Id. at 97, 99 (letter from William N. Letson, General Counsel of the Department of
Commerce, to the Senate Commerce Committee).
58 The purposes of this Act are -
(2) to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products;
(4) to promote research and investigation into the causes and prevention of
product-related deaths, illnesses, and injuries.
CPSA § 2(b).
59 Id. § 5(a).
60 NEISS, which became fully operational in 1972, has placed computer terminals in
119 hospital emergency rooms across the nation. Data on accident victims is now trans-
mitted instantaneously to the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which may then
send investigators to gather additional information, if required, as to the causes of the
accident. These statistics may help to identify and eradicate or reduce significant product
hazards.
61 CPSA § 5(b).
62 Id. § 27(h).
63 Id. § 32(b).
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developing. However, after its incubation period the Commission
should play a vital role in identifying product hazards and upgrading
safety.
The Commission may also collect information by conducting hear-
ings" and by requiring manufacturers to submit performance and
other technical data relating to their products.6 5 Also, manufacturers
and distributors subject to the Act are required to keep records avail-
able for Commission scrutiny, and to permit inspection of their prem-
ises by the Commission.66 Furthermore, persons supplying information
to the Commission are protected from any civil liability which might
otherwise ensue from such disclosure.8 7
The Injury Information Clearinghouse is directed to disseminate
the information it collects. 68 Generally, information gathered by the
Commission is to be made available to the public,6 9 and in view of the
Congressional intent to "assist consumers in evaluating the compara-
tive safety of consumer products, "7 0 this should be done in a highly
visible manner. Effective use of the mass media will alert the public to
product hazards, and exert pressure on manufacturers to take appro-
priate corrective action. If, however, safety information is buried in
an obscure comer of the Federal Register a vital benefit of the Act
will go unrealized.
Manufacturers are, however, protected against breaches of con-
fidentiality. Any information which the Freedom of Information Act71
does not require to be disclosed shall remain privileged,7 2 and trade
secrets are specifically protected. 73 Thirty days prior to public dis-
64 Id. § 27(a).
65 Id. § 27(e).
66 Id. § 16. See text accompanying notes 210-11 infra.
67 Id. § 27(d).
68 Id. § 5(a).
69 It is... important that the [Commission] make accessible to interested persons
reports, documents, communications, studies and all other materials .. .which
would enable them to monitor and participate in all proceedings in an informed
manner.
S. REP. No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972). Earlier drafts of the legislation expressly
authorized the Commission to make public disclosures of information. Id. at 22. This
authority can now be inferred from the language setting out exceptions to disclosure. See
text accompanying notes 72-78 infra.
70 CPSA § 2(b)(2).
715 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1970).
72 CPSA § 6(a)(1). In this context, the most important exceptions are trade secrets,
internal memoranda, and investigatory files.
73 Id. § 6(a)(2). The section refers to 18 U.S.C. § 1905, but no definition is found there
for "trade secrets." An oft-quoted construction is given in United States ex rel. Norwegian
Nitrogen Prods. Co., Inc. v. United States Tariff Comm'n, 6 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1925),
rev'd on other grounds, 274 U.S. 106 (1927):
[Ain unpatented, secret, commercially valuable plan, appliance, formula, or
1973]
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closure by the Commission of any adverse information, a manufac-
turer is entitled to notice and an opportunity to respond.' 4 However,
the Commission is under no obligation to include the manufacturer's
reply in its disclosure. Should the Commission find it has made in-
accurate or misleading public statements disparaging a product, it is
required to retract in a manner similar to that in which the original
statement was made.7 5
THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT
Scope of Coverage
The Act defines consumer product as:
any article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed (i)
for sale to a consumer for use in or around a permanent or tem-
porary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or other-
wise, or (ii) for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a
consumer in or around a permanent or temporary household or
residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise .... 71
subject to several exceptions. The general intent is to cover a broad
range of household products. Definitional problems may arise in close
cases (e.g., what of an industrial product converted to home use?), but
in the main the scope of the Act is clear.
One very important exception is for food, drugs, devices and cos-
metics,7 7 which are regulated by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act.78 The Senate version of the bill7 9 would have included food and
drug regulation, shifting FDA's entire responsibility to a new agency
named the Food, Drug and Consumer Product Agency. This was not
contemplated by the NCPS when it first proposed the legislation, and
must be seen as a reaction to the shortcomings of FDA. 0 The proposal
was dropped in conference.81
process, which is used for the making, preparing, compounding, treating, or
processing of articles, or materials which are trade commodities.
6 F.2d at 495.
74 CPSA § 6(b)(1).
75 Id. Presumably, if the Commission fails to so find, a court may order the retraction,
as this would be final agency action for which no adequate remedy exists. See 5 U.S.C. §
704 (1970).
76 CPSA § 3(a)(1).
771 d §§ 3(a)(1)(H) & (I).
78 21 U.S.C. § 01 et seq. (1970). The provisions of the Poultry Products Inspection
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 451 et seq. (1970), the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.
(1970), and the Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1031 et seq. (1970) continue to
apply. See CPSA § 3(a)(1) (I).
79 S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
80 See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
81 H.R. REP. No. 92-1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). In addition, the version of the
bill reported by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare would have trans-
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Also exempted are tobacco and tobacco products, motor vehicles
and motor vehicle equipment, economic poisons, firearms, aircraft, and
boats.82 Evidently, it was felt that these items did not lend themselves
to control under this Act, and that their regulation was better left to
other agencies under existing legislation.s3 A move in the House to in-
clude firearms within the Act's coverage was readily defeated, as might
be expected.84 The Commission also may not regulate85 with respect
to any hazards covered by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970,86 the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,87 the Clean Air Act,88 or the
Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act.89 While the Commission
will assume90 the functions previously delegated to HEW under the
Federal Hazardous Substances Act91 and the Poison Prevention Pack-
ferred to the Commission the duties of the Department of Agriculture under the Poultry
Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 451 et seq. (1970), the Federal Meat Inspection Act,
21 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1970). the Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1031 et seq.
(1970), 21 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970) (relating to animal drugs), and 7 U.S.C. § 1622(h)
(1970) (food inspection and grading). In order to preserve the bill's chances for passage in
the face of heavy criticism from farm-state members, Senator Moss proposed an amend-
ment withdrawing these transfers which was approved. 118 CoNG. REc. S9890 (daily ed.
June 21, 1972). Although Senator Talmadge, Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Com-
mittee, defended USDA's food inspection record ("the food inspection services of the
United States of America are the world's best and the world's greatest," 118 CONG. REC.
S9888 (daily ed. June 21, 1972)), the General Accounting Office reports tell a different
story. See CoAnTRoLLER GENaI's REPORTS To THE CONGRESS, Sept. 10, 1969, June 24, 1970,
June 30, 1970 and Nov. 16, 1971, reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. S9884-87 (daily ed., June 21,
1972).
82 CPSA § 3(a)(1). Despite the express exemption of tobacco from Commission juris-
diction under the CPSA, Chairman Richard 0. Simpson of the Commission has announced
plans to ban cigarettes whose tar or nicotine content exceeded specified levels. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 23, 1973, at 1, col. 6. Authority for such action comes not under the CPSA, but under
the Federal Hazardous Substances Act which permits the banning of "toxic substances"
which have "the capacity to produce personal injury or illness to man through ingestion,
inhalation or absorption through any body surface." 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(1)(A)(i), (g), (q).
83 E.g., the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1391 et seq.
(1970); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135 et seq. (1970);
the Federal Aviation Act, 49 US.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970); and the Federal Boat Safety Act,
46 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (Supp. I, 1971).
84 Representative Bingham's amendment was defeated by voice vote, 118 CONG. REC.
H8597 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1972). Representative Smith of California displayed the hysteria
often exhibited by gun control opponents:
The bill theoretically exempts firearms from control, but if we start a commission
like this . .. then I think this bill could come back to haunt us at some time
where they could put a rule or regulation into effect taking guns and ammunition
out of the home.
118 CONG. REc. H8564 (daffy ed. Sept. 20, 1972).
85 CPSA § 31.
86 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (1970).
87 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1970).
88 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970).
89 42 U.S.C. § 263b et seq. (1970).
90 CPSA § 30(a).
91 15 U.S.C. § 1261 et seq. (1970).
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aging Act,92 and to the Department of Commerce under the Flammable
Fabrics Act,9 3 the procedures prescribed by those statutes still must be
followed if the hazard is thereby "eliminated or reduced to a sufficient
extent." 94 Presumably, if the CPSA procedures are more effective in
reducing the danger, the Commission would not be bound by the prior
legislation.95 If that interpretation is correct, the CPSA with its strict
sanctions and comparatively swift procedures, will probably be the one
applied in most instances. Although the delay-inducing procedures of
these other laws are not solely to blame for failure to reduce any given
hazard sufficiently, they are a contributing factor.
Apart from the specific exclusions, there is a question as to when
a given product becomes a "consumer product" within the purview of
the Act. The Act refers to products which are "produced or distributed
(i) for sale to a consumer.., or (ii) for the personal use ... of a con-
sumer."'96 Articles not customarily produced for sale to, or use by a con-
sumer, i.e., industrial products, are expressly excluded. 97 Questions of
interpretation are bound to arise with respect to certain products not
normally sold to consumers but which nevertheless wind up in con-
sumers' hands. For example, the NCPS found that 150,000 injuries per
year are caused by architectural glass.98 Yet, glass doors, windows, etc.,
are customarily sold to builders who install them as part of a complete
structure. While in this illustration the product is for the ultimate use
of a consumer, and within the purview of the Act, similar situations
posing provocative problems are likely to face the courts.99
The Act applies to products affecting interstate commerce, 100 and
92 15 U.S.C. § 1471 et seq. (1970).
93 15 U.S.C. § 1191 et seq. (1970).
94 CPSA § 30(d).
95 See H. R. REP. No. 92-1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), U. S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4629 (1972). In an interesting twist, the Bicycle Manufacturers
Association of America, a trade group, has petitioned the Commission for a delay in the
implementation of a standard for children's bicycles promulgated under the Federal Haz-
ardous Substances Act, in order that the CPSA procedures be employed. See Petition by
Bicycle Manufacturers Association of America, CCH CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY GumE
41,072 (June 7, 1973). The Association argues that promulgation under the CPSA will
afford a standard applicable to all bicycles rather than those designed solely for children,
and that a federal standard under the CPSA will preempt state standards, which would
not be possible under the Hazardous Substances Act. The fact that implementation would
be delayed if the CPSA procedures were employed may also have been a factor in the
Association's reasoning.
96 CPSA § 3(a)(1).
97 Id-. § 3(a)(1)(A).
98 NCPS REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
99 E.g., items such as machine tools or industrial chemicals purchased from a jobber
or distributor. Such products are intended for industrial use, but on occasion can be
purchased by an individual in the trade for his personal use.
100 CPSA § 3(a)(12). It is, of course, constitutional for Congress to regulate intrastate
activities which "affect" interstate commerce.
[Vol. 48:126
PRODUCT SAFETY
its strictures extend not only to manufacturers, distributors, and re-
tailers of consumer products, but to private labelers (owners of brands
or trademarks who do not manufacture the products sold under such
brand names) as well. 0 1 However, a seller may not be held liable for
violation of the Act if the manufacturer has certified compliance. 0 2
A product may not be imported into the United States if it fails
to conform to the Act's requirements.' 0 3 However, the product may be
admitted under bond so that the owner or consignee may modify the
product to comply with the Act. 04 On the other hand, the CPSA does
not apply to products intended for export so long as they are not dis-
tributed for use in the United States. 0 5
The booming popularity of mobile homes led to an effort to in-
clude them within the ambit of the Act. While an amendment to that
effect failed in 1972,.0 a bill has been introduced in the current ses-
sion to bring mobile home safety within the Commission's jurisdic-
tion.1'0 7 Future efforts may be made to include other areas within the
scope of the Act if it proves successful in its regulatory mission.
Issuance of Consumer Product Safety Rules
The Commission will regulate product safety by issuing consumer
product safety rules. Such rules may establish requirements as to "per-
formance, composition, contents, design, construction, finish, or pack-
aging"; 08 require products to carry warnings or instructions;10 9 or de-
The doctrine that Congress may provide for regulation of activities not themselves
interstate commerce, but merely "affecting" such commerce, rests on the premise
that in certain fact situations the federal government may find that regulation of
purely local and intrastate commerce is "necessary and proper" to prevent injury
to interstate commerce.
Polish National Alliance of the United States of North America v. NLRB, 332 U.S. 643,
652 (1944) (Black, J., concurring).
101 CPSA § 3(a)(7).
102 Id. § 19(b). See text accompanying notes 199-203 infra.
103 CPSA § 17.
104 Id. § 17(c).
105 Id. § 18. Apparently, if other countries are willing to accept hazardous products,
the United States is willing to allow American manufacturers to export them.
106 Senator Eagleton's amendment was defeated 63-16. 118 CONG. REc. S9930 (daily ed.
June 21, 1972).
107 H.R. 2371, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
108 CPSA § 7(a)(1). Industry spokesmen argued strongly for standards expressed solely
in terms of performance characteristics.
Only in those instances where it is found infeasible to do so, should a product
safety standard pertain to other than performance characteristics, such as product
composition or design features not related to product performance.
House Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 789, 791 (1971) (statement of Walter S. Lewis, Jr.,
Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association, Inc.). Many product hazards, however, are the
direct result of the design or other characteristics of the product. For example, injuries
caused by sharp corners or projections on products, or by products whose design renders
them unstable could not be averted by performance standards. Regulation of other prod-
uct characteristics is essential to proper safety regulation.
109 CPSA § 7(a)(2).
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clare a product banned as hazardous. 110 A rule will issue if the Com-
mission finds it to be "reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce an un-
reasonable risk of injury associated with such product.""' The Act
does not define "unreasonable risk of injury," but implicitly sets forth
certain guidelines."12 A balancing test is contemplated wherein the
danger posed by the product, the consumer's awareness of the danger,
and his ability to protect himself are weighed against the effect of
safety standards upon the product's utility, cost, and availability.113 The
Act contemplates that, rather than take the lead in initiating standards,
the Commission act upon proposals submitted to it. The standard-
setting procedure is commenced by publication in the Federal Register
of a notice identifying both the product and the hazard to be regu-
lated, and inviting offers to propose standards." 4 Offerors, including
manufacturers, trade associations, independent laboratories, and con-
sumer organizations, then have 30 days to offer to develop a standard.
The Commission may, if it finds that an existing standard would serve
the purpose, publish that standard and dispense with the development
process."" Otherwise, the Commission must accept one offer so long as
it determines that the offeror is technically competent and "likely to
develop an appropriate standard" within the development period." 6
The Commission is also authorized to contribute to the offeror's cost
of development, subject to certain guidelines. 1 7 This should facilitate
the participation of consumer organizations in the standard-setting
process. 118
In addition, the Commission is directed to prescribe regulations
governing the private development of proposed standards. These regu-
110 Id. § 8.
111 Id. §§ 7(a) & 9(c)(2).
112 See S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(8) (1972); S. REP. No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1972).
113 See CPSA § 9(c). See also NCPS REPORT, supra note 1, at 11 (quoting statement of
Prof. Corwin D. Edwards, University of Oregon, NCPS Hearing, Mar. 4, 1970). It is sub-
mitted that in determining the need for a product safety rule, only the risk factors asso-
ciated with the product should be considered. If these factors indicate that the risk is
unreasonable, then the rulemaking proceeding should commence. In adopting standards,
the balancing test should come into play to help arrive at a standard which will alleviate
the danger while preserving the utility of the product. If no feasible standard can be
fashioned, the product could be declared a banned hazardous product.
114 CPSA § 7(b).
115 Id. § 7(c).
116 Id. § 7(d)(1). The development period is generally 150 days, but like other pro-
visions of the Act, the limit is flexible, and the Commission may lengthen or shorten the
period if it deems such action appropriate.
117 Id. § 7(d)(2). The contribution must appear to be necessary to aid the development,
and the offeror must be "financially responsible."
118 "Consumer organizations would be likely recipients of such financial aid." S. REP.
No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1972).
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lations will require that proposed standards be accompanied by sup-
porting data, that interested persons be provided with notice and op-
portunity to participate in development, that records be maintained
and made available to the public, that these records contain dissenting
views when such views are submitted to the developer, and that the
Commission and the Comptroller General be permitted to inspect any
records relevant to development or to expenditures of funds contribu-
ted by the Commission.11 The Act expressly includes "representatives
of consumers and consumer organizations" among "interested per-
sons."'1 20 The thrust of this section is to provide maximum participa-
tion in development, and to afford the Commission the fullest possible
basis upon which to evaluate a proposed standard. Absent these provi-
sions, there would exist a possibility of Commission ratification of in-
adequate standards, developed without the benefit of public scrutiny.
In general, the Commission may not draft a standard during the
development period.121 Where, however, no offer is accepted, or where
the only offer accepted is that of a manufacturer, distributor, or re-
tailer of the product to be regulated, the Commission may proceed
with its own development of a standard. 22 These restrictions are de-
signed to preclude duplication of effort and to avoid possible bias on
the part of the Commission staff towards its own proposed standards. 23
Too great a reliance on privately developed standards may, however,
be unhealthy. It may be expected that industry will be very anxious
to propose standards, and unless the Commission scrutinizes these
offers carefully (or consumer groups play a watchdog role), standards
which do not adequately protect the public may be adopted.
The administrative procedure for the promulgation of consumer
product safety rules parallels the informal rulemaking process under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).124 Not more than 210 days
119 CPSA § 7(d)(3).
120 1d. § 7(d)(S)(B).
121 Id. § 7(e)(2).
122 Id. May the Commission develop a standard when a trade association is the sole
offeror whose offer is accepted? If, as is likely, this provision was included because of
wariness toward standards developed by industry, the answer would be yes. However,
there is support for a contrary position, based on the contention that this provision was
included merely to prevent a single manufacturer from obtaining a competitive advantage
by developing a standard to which only his product conforms. See Scalia & Goodman,
Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 899, 913-15
(1973).
123 Fearing that the government's proposed standards would be given predominant
weight, and that the efforts of the private sector would be mere window-dressing,
private bodies would undoubtedly forego participation.
S. REP. No. 92-949, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 97, 104 (1972) (letter from William N. Letson,
General Counsel of the Department of Commerce, to the Senate Commerce Committee).
124 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). See generally, Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the
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after publication of the notice of proceeding, the Commission shall
either publish a proposed rule or withdraw the notice.125 During this
period, interested persons must be given the opportunity to comment
upon the proposed rule. 26 The Act does not require formal hearings
on the record, but unlike the APA, permits oral submissions as well as
written comments. 27 The formal rulemaking process of the APA,
which requires hearings before a trial examiner, 28 is justifiably criti-
cized as dilatory. However, it should be recognized that the informal
process does not permit an exhaustive examination on the merits, as
the agency is limited to reviewing submissions of interested persons,
without opportunity to probe or examine parties. Nor does informality
guarantee expediency. Even under the informal procedures of the
CPSA, the effective date of a rule may come as late as 15 months after
the notice of proceeding, or later if extensions have been granted. But
the Act does prescribe expedited procedures for dealing with imminent
hazards.
The intention that the Commission exercise restraint in its regu-
lations is evidenced by the conditions which must be met before a con-
sumer product safety rule may be promulgated. 29 The Commission
must make findings as to the nature and severity of the particular
hazard, the need of the public for the product, and the effect of the
rule upon the product's utility, cost, and availability. The Commission
must act so as to "minimiz[e] adverse effects on competition or disrup-
tion..., of manufacturing and other commercial practices .... "130 Finally,
the Commission must find that the rule is reasonably necessary to deal
with an unreasonable risk of injury, and that its promulgation is in the
public interest.'8 ' In the event that a standard is challenged, a review-
ing court will look to these findings to aid its determination.: 32
Generally, product safety rules are to become effective from 30 to
180 days after promulgation.13 Since compulsory safety standards apply
only to products manufactured after the effective date of the proscrip-
Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.LA.L. REv. 899 (1973), for an exhaustive discussion
of administrative law problems arising from the Act.
125 CPSA § 7(f).
126 While consumers and consumer organizations are not expressly included in this
section, the omission appears to have been inadvertent, and a court could reasonably
conclude from the remainder of the Act that consumer comments are not to be excluded.
127 CPSA § 9(a)(2).
128 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (1970).
129 CPSA § 9(c)(1).
130 d. § 9(c)(l)(D).
131 Id. § 9(c)(2).
132 See id. § I1(c).
133 Id. § 9(d)(1). Again, this date may be hastened or postponed for good cause.
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tive rule,1 34 the Act provides a mechanism to deter stockpiling. 35 One
who manufactures or imports a product between the date of promulga-
tion of an applicable rule and its effective date at a rate significantly
greater than that for a base period is subject to penalties prescribed
by the Act. 36 The base period is to be established by rule.
The Commission may amend or revoke consumer product safety
rules in accordance with the same procedures prescribed for their
issuance. 37 However, the section so providing refers only to "material"
changes in the standard; "minor" changes may be made by the Com-
mission unilaterally. Since judicial review is also limited to material
changes, 1 a "minor" change might appear unreviewable. Neverthe-
less, a court presumably could take jurisdiction of a challenge to the
Commission's determination that an amendment was not "material"
and its conclusion that adherence to statutory procedures was not
required. 39
Banned Hazardous Products and Imminent Hazards
The Act recognizes that there are certain product hazards which
cannot, as a practical matter, be eliminated or reduced. In such situa-
tions, where no feasible standard would adequately protect the public
against an unreasonable risk of injury, the Commission is empowered
to declare the item a banned hazardous product.140 This is done by
rule, following the same administrative procedure applicable to promul-
gation of consumer product safety rules. A banned hazardous prod-
uct may not be manufactured, sold, distributed, or imported into the
United States.' 4 '
Often, time is of the essence in dealing with a product which pre-
sents a serious immediate hazard. Thus, the Commission has power to
institute judicial action against "imminently hazardous consumer
products.', 42 This action may be taken against a manufacturer, dis-
134 Id.
135 Id. § 9(d)(2).
1361d. § 19(a)(7). See text accompanying notes 175-79 infra.
137 Id. § 9(e).
138 Id.
139 If the court found the Commission's determination that an amendment was not
"material" to be arbitrary or an abuse of discretion, it could direct the Commission to
follow the Act's procedures and commence an amendment proceeding. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-
06 (1970). Although such review is not prescribed by the statute, it is neither precluded by
the Act nor is the definition of materiality "committed to agency discretion." See 5 U.S.C.
§ 701 (1970).
140 CPSA § 8.
1411d. § 19(a)(2).
142 Id. § 12(a).
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tributor, or retailer of the product, or against the product itself. In the
former case, the district court may grant such relief "as may be neces-
sary to protect the public."'143 Enjoining the sale of the product is one
obvious remedy. Moreover, the Act expressly provides for mandatory
orders requiring notification to known purchasers, public notice, re-
call, repair, replacement or refund as possible remedies, all in the
court's discretion. 44 When the Commission proceeds directly against
the product, the action is one for condemnation and seizure, and is to
conform as nearly as possible to in rem proceedings in admiralty.145
In addition to taking this emergency action, the Commission is directed
to commence with due dispatch a proceeding to promulgate a con-
sumer product safety rule with respect to the product in question, if
no such rule exists.146
The Act defines "imminently hazardous consumer product" as a
product "which presents imminent and unreasonable risk of death,
serious illness, or severe personal injury."'147 However, there is no ex-
press standard for imminence. The Senate bill set forth, as a criterion,
the finding that action prior to the completion of administrative pro-
ceedings is required to protect adequately the public health and
safety.148 A differently worded definition was adopted in conference
but "imminent" was in the end, left undefined. However, the Senate
criterion appears to be a workable guideline.
In general, ultimate responsibility for enforcing the Act is situated
in the Justice Department, pursuant to the policy of centralizing gov-
ernment litigation authority in that department.149 In the case of im-
minent hazards, since immediate action is needed and inter-agency dif-
ferences of opinion might frustrate the purpose of the section, the
Commission has authority to be represented by its own attorneys.150
To further expedite these matters, the Act contains very liberal pro-
visions relating to venue, service of process, and service of subpoenas. 151
Delay has been avoided to the fullest extent possible in this area.
143 Id. § 12(b)(1).
144 1d. These remedies may also be invoked by the Commission when consumer prod-
uct safety rules have been violated. See text accompanying notes 182-86 infra.
145d. § 12(b)(2).
146 Id. § 12(c). Notwithstanding the fact that a product is subject to safety standards,
if the hazard is serious and imminent, the Commission may proceed under this section.
See id. § 12(a).
1471d. § 12(a).
148S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 311(b) (1972).
149 See note 181 infra.
150 CPSA § 12(f).
151 Id. § 12(e). Venue is proper in any district in which any defendant is found,
resides, or transacts business. Process and subpoenas may be served in any district.
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Petition for Consumer Product Safety Rule
In the event that the Commission's action (or lack thereof) is
found unsatisfactory, the Act permits the initiation of a proceeding
for the issuance, amendment, or revocation of a consumer product
safety rule by a person outside the Commission. Any interested person,
including a consumer or consumer organization, may petition the
Commission to take such action.1 2 The Commission is then given 120
days to act upon the petition.15 3 The petition procedure is generally
available with respect to agency rulemaking through the APA,15s but
the Act expands upon it by requiring that the Commission, if it denies
a petition, publish its reasons for so doing.1 55
A novel provision of the Act permits the dissatisfied petitioner to
obtain an independent judicial hearing on the merits of his petition.
If the Commission denies a petition, or fails to act within the pre-
scribed period, a de novo proceeding may be commenced in the dis-
trict court.56 If it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
that the product presents an unreasonable risk of injury, and that the
Commission's failure to act "unreasonably exposes the petitioner or
other consumers to a risk of injury,"15 7 the court shall order the Com-
mission to take the action demanded by the petition. 58 This has been
described as a "mandamus-like" action since it expands the scope of
that writ beyond mere ministerial functions of the agency.159 The
152 Id. § 10(a). The grant of legal standing to "a consumer" is extraordinarily broad.
' Id. § 10(d).
154 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
155 CPSA § 10(d). In this connection Mrs. Virginia Knauer, the President's Special
Assistant for Consumer Affairs, was concerned that the Commission might have to con-
sider even dearly frivolous petitions, to the detriment of its other duties. S. REP. No. 92-
749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 77, 80 (1972) (letter from Virginia H. Knauer to the Senate Com-
merce Committee).
16 CPSA § 10(e).
157 Although the petition procedure is available to any interested person, the sub-
sequent court action focuses on the risk of injury presented to consumers. Thus, this
section does not provide an opportunity for manufacturers to circumvent the Commission
in an attempt to obtain more favorable standards, but merely facilitates consumer par-
ticipation in rulemaking.
158 Id. § 10(e)(2).
159 S. R. No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972). Traditionally, the writ of man-
damus was limited to situations where an officer had refused to perform a ministerial
duty, and it was never available in "discretionary" situations.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty ....
Where the duty in a particular situation is so plainly described as to be free
from doubt and equivalent to a positive command it is regarded as being so far
ministerial that its performance may be compelled by mandamus ....
Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1930). Since rulemaking is in-
herently discretionary, general mandatory relief would not be available, and a new, statute-
created proceeding was needed to compel Commission action.
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purpose of the section is to curb the discretion of the Commission,
and again to provide safeguards against disregard of the public interest.
This action is also noteworthy in that it provides a standard of
review different from the norm. In this case, "substantial evidence"
will not suffice to sustain the agency decision. 160 The petitioner need
only prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an un-
reasonable hazard and the threat of injury.
Agency action affecting interest in life and health should be
subject to the most searching judicial examination. In our view,
the importance of these interests justifies a departure from the
normal standard of review. In such cases, substantial evidence in
the record should not be sufficient to sustain the agency action.161
Moreover, the issue is considered de novo, meaning that the peti-
tioner and court are not limited to the record compiled before the
Commission. Not only is standing to petition the Commission accorded
to a very broad class, but it appears that the petitioner need not even
show "injury in fact" to be properly before the court.162 The statute
requires only that the hazard-'unreasonably exposes the petitioner or
other consumers to a risk of injury"; 16 3 no actual damage need be
shown, nor does the petitioner even have to show the threat of injury
to himself. However, if this liberality leads to inundation of the courts,
it is likely that judges will superimpose the "injury in fact" standard
upon the Act, at least to the extent of requiring foreseeable injury to
the petitioner. Finally, in order to give the Commission an opportunity
to embark on its own, action-forcing suits under this section are barred
for the first three years of the Act's operation. 1'4
Judicial Review
The Act provides for review of consumer product safety rules in a
circuit court of appeals within 60 days after promulgation. 65 Review
may be sought by "any person adversely affected by such rule, or any
160 See note 168 infra.
161 S. RE. No. 92-835, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1972).
The Committee contemplates that most [Commission] actions will withstand the
scrutiny. Since this right of action gives the plaintiff no economic incentive-
only costs may be recovered in the discretion of the court-it is unlikely that a
large number of suits will disturb the orderly processes of [Commission] decision.
Yet the possibility of suit will serve as a constant spur to action safeguarding
the public.Id.
162 See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152 (1970).
163 CPSA § 10(e)(2) (emphasis added).
164 Id. § 10(g).
165 id. § 11(a).
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consumer or consumer organization." 16 6 Again, this is a very liberal
grant of standing, and insures maximum reviewability of Commission
actions.
A rule is not to be sustained unless "supported by substantial
evidence on the record taken as a whole."'167 This is the standard nor-
mally employed in connection with formal rulemaking.16 The NCPS
favored informal rulemaking partly because it felt that the substantial
evidence rule would contribute to delay and interfere with the agency's
performance. 69 However, delay is certain to ensue merely from the
existence of judicial review, irrespective of the standard employed.
Since the real potential for delay inheres in the rulemaking phase and
is averted by the use of the informal process which dispenses with the
necessity for a formal plenary hearing, delay is not a compelling argu-
ment against the substantial evidence rule.1 0 Limiting the scope of
review to a simple determination as to whether the rule is arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion would grant the Commission maxi-
mum discretion and guarantee that virtually all product safety rules
would survive judicial scrutiny. Use of the substantial evidence stand-
ard gives courts the opportunity to inquire more searchingly into the
merits of the rule. Since the Act is keyed to protecting the public
against unreasonable risks of injury, this inquiry should concern itself
to a greater degree with the public interest than with the potential
economic harm faced by manufacturers. Adherence to this rationale,
166 Id.
167Id. § 11(c). The record includes any submissions of parties during the rulemaking
proceeding, the Commission's published findings, and any additional material requested
by the court at the petitioner's instance. Id. § 11(b).
168 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(d), 706(2)(e) (1970). Substantial evidence has been defined as
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a con-
clusion." John W. McGrath Corp. v. Hughes, 264 F.2d 314, 816 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 931 (1959). It is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but somewhat greater
than that required to show non-arbitrariness.
160 Informal proceedings are also more appropriate because rulemaking is more akin
to legislation than adjudication, and the informal rulemaking procedure more closely
parallels a legislative hearing than a judicial proceeding. See NCPS R EPORT, supra note
1, at 93.
170 The implementation of product safety rules might also be delayed by the granting
of stays pending review, but such stays are granted infrequently, and only when the
petitioner can show that he faces irreparable injury should the application be denied,
that he is likely to prevail on the merits, and that the public interest will not be unduly
harmed by the delay. Likelihood of success will be difficult to show, although this is less
important where the injury faced is great. Frequently a manufacturer will be able to
show that the denial of a stay will be financially damaging as he may face changes in his
manufacturing process, but this must be balanced against the unreasonable risk of injury
posed to the public and the fact that these same costs will ultimately be incurred should
the rule be sustained by the reviewing court. Thus, delay pending review should not be
a serious problem.
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coupled with the statute's broad standing provisions, will give con-
sumers the opportunity to make certain that the Commission follows
its mandate.
Enforcement
The Act makes unlawful the following activities:171 manufacture,
sale, distribution, or importation of any product which does not con-
form to applicable safety standards, or which has been declared a
banned hazardous product; failure to permit inspection, or furnish in-
formation required under the Act; failure to notify the Commission of
substantial product hazards, or of non-compliance with safety stand-
ards;172 failure to comply with a remedial order;17 failure to certify
compliance with the Act;174 and violation of regulations relating to
stockpiling. The Act prescribes various means by which the Commis-
sion or private parties may enforce its provisions. This flexibility of
approach may be beneficial if wisely used, but it could also lead to
complete abdication of responsibility by the Commission.
Public Enforcement
Knowing violation of the Act may subject the violator to a civil
penalty of $2000 per violation. 175 Each product or incident involved
constitutes a separate offense, up to a maximum penalty of $500,000,
but the Commission has the option to compromise the penalty. The
gravity of the violation and the size of the violator's business would be
determinative factors in such a decision. 176 The term "knowing" in-
cludes both actual and constructive knowledge, 177 so it is unlikely that
a manufacturer could escape liability by claiming ignorance, although
an innocent retailer may avoid punishment by showing lack of aware-
ness of the manufacturer's failure to comply.
Furthermore, knowing and willful violation of the Act after re-
ceipt of notice of non-compliance from the Commission may subject
the violator to a fine of $50,000, or imprisonment of up to one year. 78
Since the Act pertains in large measure to corporations, this section
provides that corporate officers, directors, or agents responsible for such
violations be subject to the criminal penalties. 7 9 The specter of a
171 CPSA § 19(a).
172 See text accompanying note 182 infra.
173 See text accompanying notes 184-86 infra.
174 See text accompanying notes 199-203 infra.
175 CPSA § 20(a)(1).
176 Id. § 20(b).
177 Id. § 20(c).
178 Id. § 2 1(a).
179 Id. § 21(b).
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corporate chief executive being marched off to the penitentiary should
deter willful violation of the Act.
The Commission may also seek equitable relief, by obtaining from
a court an injunction against any violation of the Act (including the
distribution of a non-complying product), or an order to seize offend-
ing products.1 80 In any of these cases, the Commission may not enforce
the Act on its own initiative. The Attorney General must concur in
the decision to litigate.181 This raises the possibility that enforcement
may be hampered by inter-agency conflict. The Justice Department
may well feel that it has more pressing matters requiring its attention
than the prosecution of corporate officers for failure to comply with
product safety standards. However, the penalties prescribed by the
Act must remain a credible deterrent against any disregard. In addi-
tion, the injunction and seizure provisions should be used when
necessary to protect the public safety.
More intriguing than the conventional punitive and injunctive
aspects of the Act are the remedial powers afforded the Commission.
First, manufacturers, distributors, and retailers, upon learning of any
failure of a product to comply with an applicable product safety rule,
or of the existence of a defect "which could create a substantial prod-
uct hazard" must notify the Commission. 82 This latter requirement
provides a means by which corrective action may be taken against
hazards which escape the Commission's notice but which come to the
attention of the manufacturer.
After having been notified, the Commission must conduct a formal
hearing under the APA, 83 and may then require that remedial action
be taken. The Commission may order the manufacturer, distributor,
180 Id. § 22.
18128 U.S.C. § 516 (1970) reserves the conduct of litigation on behalf of the United
States to the Department of Justice. See 118 CONG. REC. S9911-13 (daily ed. June 21, 1972)
(summary by Department of Justice) arguing the merits of unified control of litigation,
stressing the need for uniform policy positions, coordination of priorities, and, rather
speciously, the excellent rapport between Department attorneys and federal judges.
182 CPSA § 15(b). There is nothing in the Act which would appear to prevent the
Commission from acting under this section upon its own discovery of the defect or failure
to comply, or upon a consumer complaint. A "substantial product hazard" is defined as a
defect which creates a substantial risk of injury to the public due to the pattern of the
defect, the number of products involved, the severity of the risk, or other factors. Id. §
15(a). Failure to comply with applicable standards creating a substantial risk is offered as
an alternative definition, but this seems to be mere surplusage in view of the fact that §
15(b)(1) explicitly includes any failure to comply with product safety rules as cause for
notification.
183 Id. § 15(f). Here, as opposed to the rulemaking process, formality (the procedures
of 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970)) is required, as the Commission is acting in a quasi-judicial ca-
pacity and sanctions may flow from the proceeding.
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or retailer to give notice of the defect.184 Such notice may, in the dis-
cretion of the Commission, take the form of a public announcement,
notice mailed to manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of the prod-
uct, notice mailed to known purchasers, or any combination of the
above. In many cases, however, notification will not be sufficient to
protect the public against the risk of injury presented. Thus the Com-
mission may, in addition, order a manufacturer or seller to take one of
the following steps:
(1) To bring such product into conformity with the require-
ments of the applicable consumer product safety rule or to repair
the defect in such product.
(2) To replace such product with a like or equivalent product
which complies with the applicable consumer product safety rule
or which does not contain the defect.
(3) To refund the purchase price of such product (less a reason-
able allowance for use...).185
The person to whom the order is directed may elect the alternative
remedy he will pursue. Unequivocal allowance of this choice could,
however, render the statute self-defeating. For instance, if the refund
option were chosen, the hazardous product still would remain in cir-
culation. Retailers may wish to choose this option when they lack the
wherewithal to repair or replace the defective product. To ensure that
the election affords a satisfactory remedy, therefore, the Commission
must approve the chosen plan. In addition, consumers are to be reim-
bursed for any costs incurred in availing themselves of defect remedies,
and no charge may be made to them for so doing.18 6
Private Enforcement
To ensure that the Act will not fail due to Commission apathy or
impotence, Congress inserted several provisions permitting private
parties to act when the Commission does not. One such provision,
already noted, involves the petition for a consumer product safety rule
and ensuing "mandamus-like" action.18 7 In addition, the Act permits
"any interested person" to bring an action in a federal district court
to enforce product safety rules or remedial orders. 88 Significantly, this
section does not expressly include consumers and consumer organiza-
tions among "interested persons," as do other provisions of the Act.
184 Id. § 15(c).
185 Id. § 15(d).
1861d. § 15(e).
187 See text accompanying notes 152-64 supra.
188 CPSA § 24.
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Nevertheless, it may be inferred from the foregoing sections that Con-
gress intended to confer standing as broadly as possible so as to ensure
that the Commission is responsive to consumer interests. At any rate,
any consumer of the particular product involved could easily establish
the requisite standing to enforce a safety standard or remedial order.189
In fairness to the government, Congress provided that notice shall
be given to the Commission, the Attorney General, and the prospec-
tive defendant at least 30 days before the commencement of a private
enforcement action. 90° Meanwhile, if the government brings an action,
or has already commenced a civil or criminal suit, the putative plain-
tiff is barred from initiating his action. Private actions are facilitated
by allowance of counsel fees when merited, but frivolous suits, on the
other hand, are discouraged by the award of costs to the prevailing
party. 9'
The Act also creates a federal cause of action for persons injured
by a knowing violation of a consumer product safety rule.192 The
NCPS originally recommended that treble damages be recoverable in
such suits, and that use of the class action device be encouraged.193
However, fears of a flood of lawsuits besieging the federal courts caused
these provisions to be abandoned. The monetary jurisdictional require-
ment of more than $10,000 will apply in such suits. 9 Since the
189 Clearly, a user of the product could claim that his safety is within the zone of
interests protected by the Act, and that exposure to what the Conmission has already
determined to be an unreasonable risk of injury is legal injury in fact. See Association
of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 897 U.S. 150 (1970).
190 CPSA § 24.
191 Id.
192 Id. § 23.
193 See NCPS REPORT, supra note 1, at 118, suggesting that the availability of the
class action would help to overcome the high costs which discourage consumer litigation.
But see S. REP. No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 97, 108 (1972) (letter from William N.
Letson, General Counsel of the Department of Commerce, to the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee): "[Tihis provision provides a windfall for injured plaintiffs. We see no justifica-
tion for this windfall." On the other side of the coin, it should be noted that a provision
for double or treble damages might be just retribution for knowing violation of the Act.
194 28 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (1970). This provision vitiates the utility of the class action,
in view of the bar against aggregation of claims to reach the jurisdictional threshold.
See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 882 (1969).
In addition, presently before the United States Supreme Court is an appeal from a
decision which further limits the availability of the class action. See Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 58 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. granted,
410 U.S. 925 (1973) (No. 888). In this case the Second Circuit held that not only must
each of the representative plaintiffs have claims in excess of the jurisdictional monetary
limit, but all the unnamed members of the class must also satisfy that requirement. Al-
though Zahn was a diversity action, there is no apparent reason why the proscription
should not apply equally to federal question controversies. Judicial hostility to the class
action is further manifested in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 8212 (Oct. 15, 1978) (No. 203), where the Second Circuit held
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quantum of proof required to prevail in the federal action will prob-
ably be no less than that needed in a state court suit based on breach
of warranty or strict tort liability, the real significance of this section
is its symbolic commitment of federal judicial power to the cause of
product safety.
Private actions under state law for damages caused by defective
products remain unhampered by the CPSA.195 The Act expressly de-
clares that compliance with federal regulations will not relieve a person
from liability at common law or under state statutory law,196 and that
the Commission's failure to deal with a particular hazard is not ad-
missible as evidence in any such action.197
Compliance Supervision
In order to discover defects and potential hazards, and to evalu-
ate compliance with safety standards, some testing of products must be
undertaken. While the Commission is empowered to test products,19s
the intent of the Act is for the Commission to play a supportive role
with the emphasis on private testing. The Act requires manufacturers
to certify that each product conforms to applicable safety standards. 199
These certificates must be based upon "a test of each product or upon
a reasonable testing program." 200 While the Commission may prescribe
the requirements for a reasonable testing program,201 the tests may be
conducted privately. In fact, there is no proscription against the tests
being conducted by the manufacturer. The absence here of a require-
ment that the Commission perform compliance tests might give rise
that the named plaintiffs must bear the expense of personal notice to each member of
the class who can be readily identified, irrespective of the number involved.
Thus, it can be inferred that only through legislative action can the class action be
made a viable device for redressing wrongs done on a large scale to consumers. In the
current session of Congress, a bill has been introduced which would permit the aggre-
gation of claims in consumer class actions, so long as the total amount claimed exceeds
$25,000. Money damages and injunctive and declaratory relief would be available, as
well as costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. Defendants would be given the option of
initiating corrective action within 30 days after having been notified of the impending
action, in which case monetary relief would not be granted. See H.R. 1105, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973). However, the bill makes the proposed action subject to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure where those rules do not contradict the proposed statute. Therefore,
the question of manageability may still plague consumer class actions. See FED. R. C1v. P.
23(b)(3)(D).
195 See CPSA §§ 10(f), 11(e), 23(b).
196 Id. § 25(a).
107 Id. § 25(b).
198 Id. § 5(b).(2).
199 Id. § 14(a).
200 Id.
201 Id. § 14(b). See also id. §§ 5(b)(2), (3).
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to spurious testing programs. 20 2 In addition, despite the good reputa-
tion enjoyed by certain independent testing organizations, the fact re-
mains that private testing and standard-setting organizations are often
reluctant to bite the hand that feeds them, and generally are sympa-
thetic to industry's needs. The Commission should therefore maintain
the capability to test all products, irrespective of third-party certification.
The major import of the certification provision is to exempt from
liability under the Act a person who sells a non-conforming product
in reliance upon a certificate of compliance. 20 3 The Commission may
also require that products bear labels certifying compliance and give
the manufacturer's name, date, and place of manufacture. 20 4 While
this may afford some small psychological benefit to consumers, its true
value is likely to be minimal. Such information may be coded,205 mak-
ing it useless to all but the most diligent consumers. The Commission
may also order, via a consumer product safety rule, that warnings or
instructions be marked on the product.20 6 But, in view of the general
public disregard for instructions and cautionary labels, primary reli-
ance should not be placed upon this procedure.207
The Commission may prevent dangerous new products from reach-
ing the market if they qualify as imminent hazards,208 but no provision
for other premarket clearance was included in the Act. The Commis-
sion may, however, prescribe procedures whereby it is apprised of the
imminent appearance of a new product on the market,20 9 and hopefully
test such products promptly, so as to minimize any risk of injury.
Another means by which the Commission may supervise com-
pliance with the Act is through the inspection of product manufactur-
ing and storage facilities.210 It may also require manufacturers, dis-
202 The Senate bill would have mandated Commission testing of products taken from
production runs. See S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
203 CPSA § 19(b).
204 Id. § 14(c).
205 Id.
2006 Id. § 7(a)(2).
207 At present the increasing volume of accidents suggests that the principal reli-
ance of the regulatory system should instead be on preventing hazardous substances
from reaching the market in the first instance, rather than on insuring only that
labeling carries warnings which perhaps are unread or unheeded by most of the
population they are designed to protect.
H. HEFMON, supra note 13, at 192.
208 See text accompanying notes 142-48 supra.
209 CPSA § 13(a). A "new consumer product" is defined as:
a consumer product which incorporates a design, material, or form of energy
exchange which (1) has not previously been used substantially in consumer prod-
ucts and (2) as to which there exists a lack of information adequate to determine
the safety of such product in use by consumers.
Id. § 13(b).
210 Id. § 16(a).
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tributors, and retailers to maintain records relating to compliance for
Commission inspection. 211
COMPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS
In general, federal standards will preempt state regulation of
product safety.212 In certain cases, however, the Commission may per-
mit the enforcement of a state standard if it is more stringent than its
federal counterpart, "is required by compelling local conditions, and
... does not unduly burden interstate commerce."2 13 Since most prod-
ucts are distributed so widely that differing state standards would be
extremely burdensome to interstate commerce, this exemption will
have very limited application.
The Act also creates a Product Safety Advisory Council, which
has no real authority but which may serve the Commission in a con-
sultative capacity.21 4 The Council shall be composed of fifteen mem-
bers: five from federal, state, and local governments, five from con-
sumer product industries (including at least one representative of
small business), and five from various "consumer organizations, com-
munity organizations, and recognized consumer leaders."215 The Coun-
cil may propose product safety rules216 and be consulted before the
commencement of an action against an imminently hazardous product,21 7
but its major function is to keep the Commission apprised of industry
and consumer views and problems.
It is probably true that in government an agency's potential effec-
tiveness is largely determined by its budget. This is not to say that
well-financed agencies are always effective, but merely that without
adequate appropriations an agency cannot fulfill its purpose. The
NCPS's proposed bill2 1 8 was relatively parsimonious, authorizing just
$5 million, $7.5 million, and $10 million respectively for the first three
years of the Act's operation. 219 The Senate, with characteristic largesse,
increased these figures to $250 million, $300 million, and $350 million,
211 Id. § 16(b).
212 Id. § 26(a).
218 Id. § 26(b). This rather vague language was in the original NCPS bill, and can be
traced to NCPS REPORT, supra note 1, at 87. It should be interesting to see what local
conditions can be found to prompt product safety standards different from the federal
standards. In the environmental area, the need for such flexibility is apparent; in product
safety, while it is not harmful, it will probably remain little used.
214 CPSA § 28.
215 Id. § 28(a).
216 Id. § 28(c).
217 Id. § 12(d)(1).
218 See note 19 supra.
219 S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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although the latter figures included amounts for food and drug regu-
lation. The Act as passed pared these figures down to $55 million, $59
million, and $64 million for fiscal 1973-1975.22o These sums do not in-
clude amounts necessary for the construction of a research and testing
facility.221
The draftsmen of the Act intended the Commission to be inde-
pendent in the fullest sense of the word. Accordingly, the Act directs
the Commission to transmit a copy of its budget requests to Congress
concurrently with its submission to the President and the Office of
Management and Budget.222 This is intended to ensure that the prod-
uct safety budget is not covertly pruned before Congress has a chance
to evaluate it. Predictably, the Administration was strongly opposed
to this idea. In upholding the concept of a unified executive budget,
officials argued that allocation of scarce resources, determination of
priorities and the need for coordination demanded prior review in the
Executive Branch.223 These are sound general management principles,
but it is apparent Congress feared product safety would be given short
shrift by the White House and therefore left itself an opportunity to
evaluate independently the Commission's financial needs.
REJECTED PROPOSALS
One of the more controversial as well as innovative provisions of
the original NCPS bill which was not incorporated in the final Act
called for the appointment of a Consumer Safety Advocate. This pro-
vision reflected the attitude that regulatory agencies are too solicitous
of industry views, and that the public has insufficient access to these
agencies. 224 Under the NCPS proposal, the Advocate would have been
appointed by the President, and would have had the following powers:
To receive and act upon consumer complaints; to evaluate standards,
orders, and hazards; to obtain information from the Commission; to
appear before the Commission as a party or witness; to request that the
Commission take certain actions in rulemaking and enforcement areas;
220 CPSA § 32(a). However, for fiscal 1974, the Commission requested just $30.9 mil-
lion, only slightly more than half the amount authorized by the enabling legislation.
221 Id. § 32(b). See text accompanying note 63 supra.
222 Id. § 27(k).
223 See S. REP. No. 92-749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 83, 85 (1972) (letter from Frank C.
Carlucci, Associate Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to the Senate Com-
merce Committee).
224 Quite as private enterprise requires counsel to represent its interest in dealings
with agencies of Government, the public requires an Advocate who will defend
consumer safety against exploitation, excess, or neglect.
NCPS REPORT, supra note 1, at 115.
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to appeal any order, regulation or standard issued by the Commission;
and, very importantly, to make public statements. 225
Obviously, there were very strong reactions to this proposal. The
creation of the Advocate would have given consumers a voice in the
regulatory process, and would have afforded them true representation
in appearances before the Commission and legal actions against it. An
industry spokesman called the Advocate "a high-level backseat driver. '226
The Administration also opposed the contention that government did
not adequately represent the public interest.227 Ultimately Congress
succumbed, and the Advocate was dropped from the Act.
Frequently, in recent years, there has been discussion of the ap-
pointment of "ombudsmen" to represent the public in the face of
burgeoning and increasingly impersonal bureaucracy. This trend will
continue, and the idea of a consumer advocate is far from dead. 228
It will be with us until our institutions become more responsive to
human needs.
Another reason set forth for the failure of governmental regula-
tions in various areas is the lack of accountability of individuals. The
failures are perceived as institutional, but the institutions are composed
of people. Thus, it was originally proposed that legal actions be per-
mitted against individual employees of the Commission for failure to
perform their statutory duties. Sanctions could run from suspension
from employment to fines and imprisonment.
This approach, which was not adopted by the Act, is overly sim-
plistic. Because of the synergistic nature of bureaucracy, it is often im-
possible to fix individual responsibility for a particular action or omis-
sion. The issue can rarely be framed as an outright refusal to perform
a clearly mandated duty. More often than not, problems arise for mis-
allocation of priorities, inadequate information, inadequate resources,
225 Proposed Bill § 4, House Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 504. (1972).
228 House Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 858, 860 (1972) (statement of J. Edward Day,
Electronic Industries Association). Ralph Nader retorted: "The importance of this office
can be seen in its universal denunciation by industry representatives as a 'troublemaker'
and 'administrative freak."' House Hearings, pt. 3, at 898. Nader called for strengthening
the Advocate by providing an independent funding base and power to conduct field
investigations.
227 See S. REP. No. 92-749, 92d. Cong., 2d Sess., 88, 91 (1972) (letter from Elliot L.
Richardson, Secretary of HEW, to the Senate Commerce Committee).
228 In 1971 the House passed a bill creating a Consumer Protection Agency which
included an advocate with somewhat limited power. 117 CoNe. REc. H9582-83 (daily ed.
Oct. 14, 1971). The Senate had before it in 1972 a similar bill with expanded powers for
the Advocate, but it was shelved after a move to cut off debate failed. Similar measures
have been reintroduced in the 92d Congress. See S. 707; S. 1160; H.R. 14; H.R. 21; H.R.
1160, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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and a lack of coordination. The imposition of severe penalties on civil
servants does not present a constructive approach to these problems.
A better solution is to maximize public participation in the regu-
latory process. Full disclosure of information, coupled with the "man-
damus-like" action, 229 should be sufficient to spur Commission action.
A consumer advocate would, of course, be a valuable supplement.230
Only after these measures prove deficient should the imposition of
civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal liability upon civil servants be con-
sidered. 231
CONCLUSION
While hazardous products do not have the dramatic, highly visible
impact of other societal ills, they do present a very serious concern.
The CPSA represents a sincere effort to tackle this problem. To a cer-
tain extent, it also represents a departure from the conventional federal
regulatory scheme which tends to accommodate those to be regulated.
The Act gives the Consumer Product Safety Commission autonomy
and fairly strong enforcement powers. It also makes it quite plain that
consumer protection is the principal objective of the Act, as it provides
numerous opportunities for consumers to participate in the regulatory
process and to exercise vigilance over the Commission.
Certainly, there are changes which, if incorporated, would make
for greater effectiveness. If the Commission is to have juiisdiction over
products like flammable fabrics and household chemicals, it ought to
be able to employ the provisions of the CPSA with regard to them,
rather than having to rely upon less effective statutes. The Act's rule-
making and enforcement powers are vigorous, and should be extended
to as many product categories as possible. Should the Commission
prove effective in regulating hazardous consumer products, serious
consideration to its assumption of food and drug regulation would be
warranted.
The Commission should have the power to develop safety stand-
ards on its own in addition to accepting outside offers to do so. If not,
229 See text accompanying notes 156-64 supra.
230 "The ubiquitous presence of the consumer spokesman should stiffen the spine of
the most timid official." H. HEFm oN, supra note 13, at 3.
231 One would still encounter the problem of developing standards for courts to
apply in determining what constitutes a breach of duty sufficient to incur liability. Since
courts generally defer to agency expertise in discretionary matters, it is difficult to foresee
a situation where the imposition of liability upon Commission employees would be ap-
propriate, especially since other means of ensuring Commission action exist. 28 US.C.
§ 1361 (1970) makes available a mandamus action against the Commission for failure to
perform any clear legal duty; imposing individual liability would only open the door to
abuse, and encourage timidity.
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the Commission will never develop the technical capacity to perform
its regulatory task. Compliance testing by the Commission should be
mandatory. If manufacturers seek to use judicial review as a delay
tactic, thereby frustrating safety regulation, courts must expedite peti-
tions for review, in recognition that rapid implementation of safety
standards is essential to the public interest.
The Commission must use its enforcement power not vindictively,
but productively. Remedy plans which do not reduce the threat of in-
jury should be rejected. The Commission should supervise manufactur-
ers to ensure that corrective action is taken.
Finally, the creation of a consumer advocate, empowered to repre-
sent the consumer interest before the Commission and the courts,
should be further explored. This would accomplish conveniently the
apparent intent of Congress to provide for public access, while alleviat-
ing the impact of the Act upon court calendars. If the Department of
Commerce can be created to promote American industry, 32 and the
Department of Labor charged with serving the interests of working
people,2 33 is it too much to ask for the creation of an office in government
which unabashedly represents the interest of millions of consumers?
The Act will be something of an imposition upon businessmen,
and will probably increase the cost of many products, an all-too-familiar
phenomenon in the United States today. But one can be certain that
the victims of exploding aerosol cans, improperly built bicycles, and
incendiary appliances would willingly have paid a few cents more to be
free from injury. The careless will continue to find ways to hurt them-
selves, but we should nevertheless make it our purpose to eliminate
built-in hazards which plague the unsuspecting and the defenseless.
Richard L. Rosen
232 See 15 U.S.C. § 1512 (1970).
It shall be the province and duty of ... [the Department of Commerce] to foster,
promote, and develop the foreign and domestic commerce, the mining, manufac-
turing, shipping, and fishery industries, and the transportation facilities of the
United States ....
Id.
233 See 29 U.S.C. § 551 (1970):
The purpose of the Department of Labor shall be to foster, promote, and develop
the welfare of the wage earners of the United States ....
